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The national debate on health care reform focuses on making the private insurance market more socially 
efficient by reducing the number of uninsured. At the time of this writing, it is uncertain what national health 
insurance reform may be enacted—be it implementing a public plan option provided by a National Health 
Insurance Exchange, expanding Medicare and Medicaid to cover larger segments of the population, or 
mandating health insurance. Thrown into this mix of options is the cooperative provision of health insurance. 
To inform this discussion, we review the previous problems Wisconsin dairy farmers had in accessing 
affordable health care—leading to the formation of the Farmers’ Health Cooperative of Wisconsin (FHCW). 
While many farmers operating in remote rural areas may have limited access to health care practitioners, a 
more fundamental problem is access to affordable health insurance. Although today’s farmers do not fall into 
the conventional categories of disadvantaged groups, the occupational hazards of farming make them an at-
risk group that drives health insurance premiums to levels that exceed their willingness and ability to pay. 
Because farmers traditionally enter the health insurance market as individual purchasers and not part of 
larger pools, their burden of health care costs is substantially higher. Even if they make informed choices, 
farmers may face higher premiums and lower coverage than other individuals with comparable health 
characteristics. 
In Wisconsin and many other states, the rich tradition of agricultural cooperatives provides a significant 
potential for health care delivery. Instead of transacting as high-risk individuals for health insurance, farmers 
can increase their bargaining power by forming a health insurance cooperative to purchase affordable group 
health insurance. The impetus behind the formation of Farmers’ Health Cooperative of Wisconsin (FHCW) is 
simply that collective bargaining increases purchasing power—farmers can get health care coverage for a 
better value than buying it on their own. By pooling farmer interests and using the existing regulatory 
environment to form cooperatives we describe how farmers were able to improve upon their existing market 
choices of health care coverage. But, can lessons be learned from this experience about the viability of the 
cooperative option for other underserved segments of the population? 
The Farmers Insurance Problem 
With incomes and assets well above the U.S. household average, farmers do not typically belong to an 
economically vulnerable group and health insurance coverage is higher among farm households compared 
to other U.S. households (Jones, et. al., 2009). Still, as with any small business enterprise, health care costs 
remain a serious challenge because as a group farmers do not have adequate coverage. For instance, even 
though 95 % of all surveyed farm households studied in seven Mid-western states had health insurance, 23% 
reported financial hardship—resulting from health care expenditures exceeding 10% of monthly income 
(Pryor, et. al., 2008). In Wisconsin, a study of dairy farmers found that one in five farmers were uninsured. 
The same study also reported out-of-pocket health care expenses as a predominant cause for exiting 
farming. Dairy farmers with insurance reported that farm-related injuries and other chronic conditions were 
often not covered by the insurance they held at the time (Wisconsin Family Farm Facts, 2002 and Todd, 
2007). This is because many farmers with health insurance have only major medical and catastrophic coverage. 
Like most small business owners, farmers have three choices in purchasing health insurance: they can buy 
insurance in the small group market, in individual insurance markets, or through off-farm employment. Each 
alternative poses problems. The small group insurance market is highly regulated in the United States. For 
instance, in Wisconsin, rating restrictions prevent premiums variations greater than 30% from the midpoint for 
policies issued by the insurer to the typical person in the pool. Wisconsin regulations also require insurers to 
provide coverage for pre-existing conditions, although it can be priced differently (OCI, 2009). 
Typically farmers are priced at the high end of the rate band due to their de facto risk characterization. In this 
environment younger farm employees typically choose not to enroll in insurance plans with the farmer and 
buy insurance elsewhere or not at all. This means farmer-employers lose bargaining power because they 
have a pool comprised only of family members and older employees. Thus they are presented with the 
difficult choice of risking health and forgoing insurance for some or all family members, or purchasing 
insurance with extremely high deductibles and limited coverage. Furthermore, family farms without 
employees have to compete in the more expensive individual insurance market. 
A vast majority of farmers buy health insurance in the individual market, if they buy at all. The choices 
available in terms of prices or coverage are very limited. Unlike small group markets, health insurance 
options within individual market are subject to fewer regulations. Insurance contracts are underwritten per 
risk factor and are customized to each farmer’s risk attributes. Farmers can also be denied coverage, have 
pre-existing conditions clauses, and face unreasonably high deductibles and/or co-pay requirements. Again, 
sick and older farmers are more likely to bear the brunt of high health care costs. The 2002 edition of 
Wisconsin Family Farm Facts reported that over half of Wisconsin dairy farmers 55 or older were 
underinsured. 
The last option available and used by the vast majority of farmers who have health insurance is coverage 
through off-farm employment, often through a member of the farm family (Wisconsin Family Farm Facts, 
2002 and Pryor, et. al., 2008). The difficulty for many farmers, however, is access to those off-farm jobs. For 
many rural communities, employment opportunities, particularly opportunities that provide adequate health 
insurance benefits, are hard to come by. Losing family members to off-farm employment for health insurance 
purposes also means depletion of skilled labor for farm operations. Even though the initial intent for seeking 
off-farm labor is to keep the family farm intact, the loss of labor can have the effect of weakening the 
commitment to keep the farm and increasing the likelihood of closing family farms. 
The 2002 study of Wisconsin dairy farmers showed that even when farmers had access to health insurance, 
58% reported carrying only major medical policies with $500 deductibles (Wisconsin Family Farm Facts, 
2002). Only one out of every four fully insured farmers reported having any preventive care. This means 
farmers either neglected getting routine care—increasing the likelihood of future major medical expenses—or 
paid for preventive care out of pocket. Furthermore, because many farm-related injuries are not covered by 
insurance, farmers have to absorb both the cost of medical bills due to the injury as well as lost income. Most 
farm workers do not qualify for worker compensation. 
The Cooperative Organizational Form 
A health insurance cooperative differs from other organizational forms in that owners of the firm are the 
insurance consumers. This means two separate economic interests, business decisions—aimed at profit 
making, solvency, monitoring management among others--and consumption decisions--such as 
standardization of plans, coverage options and services desired--are condensed in a single stakeholder 
group. The consolidation of interests can create benefits for insurance consumers. 
Collectively bargaining as owners, consumers can voice their preferences on type of coverage, choice of 
standardized insurance plans, and stabilizing premiums. Because of the size of the bargaining unit, even in 
the presence of risk rating, consumers-owners may face better premiums as compared to the individual 
market, for a given risk category. In this sense consumer-ownership removes the social cost of under 
consumption and extends the market to include high-risk people who otherwise get priced out of the market. 
Increased size of bargaining unit and cohesive preferences for insurance can widen choice in coverage and 
plans available to the patron owners. This can be a significant market benefit. Evidence suggests that 
administrative cost burdens severely restrict consumer choice in health plans in the individual and small group (Wicks, 2002). 
Cooperatives require a critical mass of consumers for insurers to be willing to insure them. Sociologists and 
psychologists have long argued that group identity can significantly alter economic decisions; ownership and 
common bond can make a consumer feel like an insider and create enough incentives to prevent the pool 
from unraveling. Being an insider can also deter ex-post moral hazard by providing incentives to prevent risky 
or costly behavior. As owners, the board can collectively monitor and combat over utilization by changing the 
benefit plan designs. Cohesion of interests can serve as an effective tool to reduce risky behavior. For 
example, I am less likely to operate a chain saw under the influence of alcohol if my neighbor farmer who is 
also a member of the cooperative is watching me. 
While size of the bargaining unit and ownership have the potential to improve upon market outcomes, close 
proximity of consumer-owners to the board and management may hinder best business practices. For 
example, a well-meaning consumer board may try to accommodate too many disparate consumer interests, 
jeopardizing pool stability and leading to pool disintegration. 
There are many examples of Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives (HIPCs) that have failed because of 
small pool sizes, inability to contain administrative costs and difficulty in attracting insurers. A single bad year 
with many claims can expose the cooperative to the “death spiral” where healthy people start leaving (Hall, 
Wicks and Lawler, 2001). Other examples of failed cooperatives include the Family Health Plan Cooperative 
in Wisconsin, which wrote health maintenance plans for more than 70,000 enrollees but exercised bad 
management practices, resulting in the cooperative failing (OCI, 1997). 
Farmers’ Health Cooperative of Wisconsin 
Because of the rich tradition of agricultural cooperatives in Wisconsin, particularly within the dairy sector, 
farmers came together with the Cooperative Network to advocate legislation that would permit farmers to 
form cooperatives for health care purposes. The result was the Farmers’ Health Cooperative of Wisconsin 
(FHCW). It provides an informative case study in the context of the current health care reform debates. 
The legislation focused on increasing farmers bargaining power, given their unique insurance needs and their 
risk characteristics, so that collectively they could negotiate better insurance contracts than on their own. In 
2003, Coop Care, the state legislation under Wisconsin statutes section 185.99, authorized the formation of 
HIPCs and allows them to buy insurance, under rules that apply to the large-group insurance market, from 
licensed insurers for their member employers and farmer households. Cooperatives that form under Coop 
Care do not have the authorization to act as insurers. The state of Wisconsin has a separate statute for 
cooperatives to act as insurers that subject them to state insurance regulations. 
Since farmers are considered a high-risk group, the credibility of the cooperative hinged on the Federal 
appropriation of $ 4.45 million, through the United States Department of Agriculture, for startup administrative 
costs and an initial stop-loss fund. In 2007 the FHCW bargained and formulated an insurance scheme 
tailored to meet farmers’ needs at more reasonable prices through ATENA (ANTHEM, starting January 2010) 
Insurance. 
All Wisconsin farmers between the ages of 18-64 with 66% of their income derived from farming activities are 
eligible to become members of FHCW including individual farmers, farm households, farm employees, and 
larger farmer/agribusinesses. At present, FHCW provides insurance for 1,146 households with approximately 
2,600 individuals covered. The cooperative offers six different plans with initial underwriting that establishes 
differential rates across members. This allows some flexibility in crafting policies that are specific to each 
person’s risk characteristics and needs. 
The cooperative insurance plans have the following features: guaranteed issue—all farmers meeting 
eligibility criteria can purchase insurance through the cooperative, coverage for work related injuries—the 
plan also covers work related injury not covered by worker compensation benefit and provides up to 
$2000,per member and per accident, to cover out-of-pocket medical costs resulting from accidents; 
preventive care coverage up to $ 500; prescription drug coverage; maternity coverage; and mental health 
coverage. 
The FHCW is still in its formative stage, and, hence, it is too soon to predict whether it will succeed. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that farmers belonging to the cooperative are pleased with the health 
insurance scheme. 
Preliminary Evidence of Improved Market Outcomes 
Because of guarantee issue, even those farmers with pre-existing conditions, meeting the eligibility 
requirement, can purchase insurance. This is a marked improvement from the individual market where 
insurers can deny coverage. The cooperative has extended the insurance market to include approximately 
200, or 8% of current members, previously uninsured farmers. Clearly, guaranteed issue can be a double-
edged sword; it can attract higher risk consumers to the more generous coverage thus making the pool 
vulnerable to unraveling. FHCW has increased its membership by 146 since opening its doors to 1000 
member households. 
The best improvements, according to anecdotal evidence, are in the form of improved insurance coverage 
and choice in plans and providers. Many farmers claim that for the first time they have access to 24-hour 
nurse line, preventive care, a choice among plans, and freedom to choose from different health care 
providers. FHCW provides the state-mandated package with maternity care and mental health. In the 
individual market, maternity coverage is generally purchased as a rider, which can add $1000 annually to 
premiums. Furthermore, the Federal Mental Parity Law does not apply to individual markets so mental health 
coverage, if offered at all, is extremely limited. 
Since Wisconsin dairy farmers are already entrenched in the culture of cooperative business structures they 
are less likely to leave the health insurance cooperative for marginal improvements outside the cooperative. 
The benefits of ownership stake, improved product choice, product quality and requiring a three-year 
commitment must outweigh healthy farmers’ outside options—with perhaps less generous coverage—to 
prevent the pool from unraveling. 
This said, given the risk characteristics of the pool, guaranteed issue, and historical evidence of HIPC failure, 
it is likely that some government intervention will be needed to keep the cooperative viable. The $4.45 million 
stop loss fund buffers the cooperative against an extremely bad claims year. 
Future Potential for Health Insurance Cooperatives 
The FHCW provides insights into the expandability of cooperatives to cover farmer groups in other states, or 
small businesses and the self-employed. Advantages of the cooperative model include the following: 
1.  Collective bargaining can improve choice in plans and standardizes coverage giving consumers a 
better value at competitive rates. 
2.  Strong common insider identity can act as a commitment device to prevent pool disintegration. 
3.  Insider identity and ownership stake can provide better incentives to reduce ex-post moral hazard—
stabilizing premium increases for the consumer-owners. 
4.  To the extent there is imperfect competition in the market for health insurance, consumer ownership 
might lead to a pro-competitive effect of enhanced coverage and quality. 
5.  Inside information and participatory governance can create incentives for monitoring management 
and leveraging bargaining power. 
Since the inception of Coop Care many other bargaining cooperatives have formed in Wisconsin. For 
example, Healthy Lifestyles Cooperative currently includes 120 small employers and 3,600 individuals and 
Physicians Health Cooperative includes members of the Wisconsin Medical Society. 
Still, the cooperative business model does not solve adverse selection problems. Guaranteed issue to 
include all risk types, a desired social optimum, tends to attract a higher ratio of unhealthy people. If the 
healthy people do not value ownership and insider identity sufficiently to forego outside options, like all other 
private insurers in the small group and individual market, providers need to write insurance contracts that are 
less attractive to the high claimants. In such an instance cooperatives will not be able to keep health care 
costs low. Cooperatives are not good institutional solutions for a group comprised entirely of high-risk users 
such as the elderly or dialysis patients. Cooperatives rely on critical pool size and a high ratio of healthy people in their group to effectively provide insurance. 
Cooperatives may not be the best market intervention for the very poor if the negotiated premiums are too 
high and exceeds their willingness and/or ability to pay. In this case the government would need to intervene 
and subsidize the cooperative negotiated premium. Thus, cooperatives can be a potential solution to the 
health care crisis but cannot be the entire solution; they are not a “magic bullet”. Government subsidies are 
still required to achieve the socially desirable outcome of insuring the poor or the sick. Governments have a 
critical role to play if HIPCs are to be part of any reform package—as an arms length reinsurer for unforeseen 
high claims years or a subsidizer of high risk claimants. 
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